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Permissive Politics and Entrepreneurial Transgression in a Chinese Border Town 
 
Juan Zhang 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary experiences of Han Chinese traders in Hekou, a remote town on the 
China-Vietnam border inform discussion of permissive politics and entrepreneurial 
transgression at the peripheries of the state. Permissive politics facilitate the 
transnational movement of goods across national borders in both formal and informal 
ways. Examination of cross-border smuggling as both an everyday strategy of profit-
making and an act of ordinary transgression clarifies the ways in which borderland 
permissiveness normalizes and even rewards certain unauthorized practices on the part 
of by traders, vendors, and individuals who undertake entrepreneurial activities. 
 
Keywords: China, Vietnam, borders, border trade, permissiveness, smuggling, 
transgression.  
 
Do you see the bridge over there? That’s the national border, the “first-class 
border crossing point” (yiji kou’an). Those who have passports and official 
papers go through that border. But there are other passages by the rivers too, 
and those are the “second-class border crossing points” (erji kou’an). Here 
we take boats. It’s very convenient. We know them very well. 
— Wen Jiansheng, a pineapple trader and tour guide.1 
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While explaining the multiple ways of crossing the China-Vietnam border at the town 
of Hekou, the Chinese pineapple trader Wen Jiansheng showed me the different 
crossing points that borderlanders called “first-class” (yiji) and “second-class” (er’ji). 
This local classification borrows the official language of the Chinese State Council that 
recognizes two classes of state-designated trading ports with special permission to 
engage in transnational trade as part of China’s economic “opening” and reform. The 
council authorizes and directly controls first-class ports, while provincial governments 
authorize second-class ports under local management (State Council 1985). In the 
context of  the China-Vietnam border at Hekou, this borrowed language suggests clear 
local understandings of how national borders take on different forms, fall under 
different levels of authority and have differing significance. The bridge that connects 
Hekou to the neighbouring Vietnamese town of Lào Cai has become synonymous with 
“first-class crossing points” (yiji kou’an), reflecting the higher form of authority and 
control that govern the flow between China and Vietnam there. In contrast, nearby river 
crossings are “second-class” (er’ji); their use is a matter of local practice, and they 
provide alternative ways of traversing the border that suit borderland conditions and 
needs. In local terminology, the two classes of border crossing reflect the ingenious 
adoption of official discourse to legitimize and naturalize what would otherwise be 
considered “illegal” forms of border crossing by local police and regulatory authorities. 
More importantly, the existence of the two classes of crossings brings to light the 
permissive politics that sustain the informal mobility of people and goods across 
borders in ways that do not challenge state authorities.  
Permissive politics have been a subject of enduring interest in  scholarship on 
state power and its relation to borderland practices and livelihood strategies. Studies of 
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cross-border lives have focused on local resistance to state rules, suggesting that 
borderland permissiveness is a result of the state’s inability to control its margins. 
Flynn’s ethnography (1997) of the Shabe region along the Benin-Nigeria border, for 
example, examined the ways in which ordinary borderlanders collectively forged a 
strong sense of “border identity” (Flynn 1997, p. 311) to claim their entitlements and 
status in transborder trade. Blaming the state for failing to lift them out of poverty, 
Shabe borderlanders asserted their own authority over the flows of persons and 
commodities through the region. Passi (1996) also provided an ethnographic account of 
everyday dynamics at the border between Finland and Russia, where practices carried 
out by villagers, traders and other actors often challenged the de jure international 
border. While borders remained sites at which state power was manifested, the everyday 
practices of ordinary people contradicted and defied the meanings of bounded 
territoriality and power. A more recent account of transborder trade between Mexico 
and Guatemala has showcased the strategies of ordinary farmers who insist on the right 
to “free trade” that defies official rules and regulations (Galemba 2012, p. 716). These 
examples highlight scholars’ attention to the contested nature of borders, and suggest 
that local actors have the agency and capacity to render the state “powerless”—, 
especially in the context of everyday negotiations of resources and opportunities. To a 
certain extent, the scholarship has taken borderland permissiveness as a sign of local 
victory and state defeat.  
Studies have also offered an alternative perspective, according to which the state 
and local actors are not on opposing sides in borderland power negotiations. The 
exploration of the notions of flows, permeability and porosity, a new conceptual turn 
towards mobility challenges the territorial image of the boundary-bound state’s 
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monopolizing, or at least attempt to monopolize, the geography of power.2 This body of 
work questions the centrality of the state in the making of borderland spaces.3 It focuses 
on the more fluid, less predictable quotidian experiences of ordinary people in 
borderlands and on the ways in which these experiences unsettle the idea of state 
centrality. Boundaries and flows co-exist, turning the border into a lived space of local 
strategies and tacit negotiations (Eilenberg and Wadley 2009; Sur and Kalir 2012; van 
Schendel and de Maaker 2014). In this context, borderland permissiveness indicates 
localized political manoeuvring in which the state is but one player among many. 
Dynamic “regimes of permissiveness” generate “zones of licitness” (Kalir, Sur, and van 
Schendel 2012, p. 19). These zones are not “exceptions or surreptitious hideaways” but 
rather everyday spaces, in which state agents are “routinely and profitably embedded in 
wide-ranging networks of informal transnational brokerage” (Kalir, Sur, and van 
Schendel 2012, p. 19). Borderland permissiveness suggests not so much a lack of reach 
on the part of the state as its deliberate fashioning of licitness by “turning a blind eye to 
the numerous infringements of formal rules” (Kalir, Sur, and van Schendel 2012, p. 19). 
This licitness which makes possible the emergence of a parallel economy essential to 
borderland livelihoods.  
At the China-Vietnam border, the co-existence and legitimacy of everyday 
movement at “first-class” and “second-class” border crossing points exemplify such 
licitness. The “first-class” crossing point at Hekou — the bridge — is a solid structure 
superimposed on the natural terrain. It represents the authority of the state, constantly 
present and untouchable. On the bridge, traders, peddlers, trucks and tricycles line up 
for inspection at formal checkpoints. They declare traded goods to the authorities, and 
travellers’ permits are checked and stamped. Away from the bridge,  those who have 
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intimate local knowledge and are able to exert local authorities use the “second-class” 
crossing points for illicit activities. Less visible passage is by means of motor- or 
peddle-boats. These boats are small and flexible, allowing people and goods to get to 
the other side of the border quickly and quietly. The bridge, like the boats traversing the 
two rivers that merge at Hekou, illustrates the thriving parallel economy that sustains 
the livelhoods of many people in the locality. Smuggling, petty corruption, and tax 
evasion are commonplace in the border zones of licitness. State agents normalize and 
justify  these small transgressions as part of daily life. They have local meaning and 
relevance, instead of constituting what Donnan and Wilson call the “subversive 
economy” (Donnan and Wilson 1999, p.88). People at the border take part in the 
situated practice of “making law” (Endres 2014, p. 611), which continues to redefine 
local understandings and practices of legality and illegality, transgression and order.  
This article discusses the permissive politics at the China-Vietnam border that 
facilitates both formal and informal transborder movement and gives legitimacy to 
entrepreneurial transgressions on the part of traders and state actors. Focusing primarily 
on the Chinese perspective, I describe the contemporary experiences of Han Chinese 
traders in Hekou and their flexible strategies of doing business at the border. Scholars 
such as Kirsten Endres (2014 and 2015), Chan Yuk-Wah (2013), and Sarah Turner (, 
2013 and 2010) have treated narratives of Vietnamese livelihood strategies and the 
Vietnamese perspective of borderland transgressions. What is lacking in extant work, in 
fact, is a specific Chinese perspective on the exercise, facilitation and regulation of 
Chinese traders’ and state agents’ success in forging partnerships on the basis of a 
situated understanding of mutual interests. By offering this Chinese perspective, this 
article examines the process by which Han Chinese traders become permissible subjects 
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at the border. They are able to use local knowledge and networks to navigate their way 
through regulations, controls and changing policies and thus to advance their social and 
economic interests. Local authorities do not consider them dangerous bodies to be 
controlled, but rather harmless, apolitical subjects that play productive roles in the 
transnational marketplace. Their everyday transgressions at the border are therefore licit 
and permissible, constituting a kind of “controlled informality” (Kodoth and Varghese 
2012, p. 169).  
The article draws on data collected during two periods of fieldwork, in 2007–8 
and 2012, in Hekou. I conducted the bulk of the fieldwork in 2007, when I carried out 
participant observation at Hekou’s  markets. I had informal conversations and thirty 
formal interviews with Han Chinese traders. Most of these traders were in their thirties 
and forties and not originally from Hekou, They had migrated to the border region in 
the 1990s and the 2000s for work or business. The majority engaged in “buy and sell” 
(maimai) —dealing in a variety of goods, including clothes, household wares, fashion 
accessories, seasonal produce, mobile phones, DVDs and books. Many, like Wen 
Jiansheng,  also offered personalized day tours to Lào Cai, including special visits to the 
casino-hotel, on the other side of the border to their fellow Chinese when there was a 
lull in business. Our conversations and interviews mainly took place at teahouses and 
during dinner banquets, when Chinese businessmen hosted their business partners. I 
also regularly joined five traders when they visited Lào Cai to make business 
arrangements with their Vietnamese partners. In 2012, I carried out a one-month follow-
up field visit to Hekou, where I met up with previous informants and made new 
contacts. Our conversations revolved around business uncertainties in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis of 2008 and in the context of slower economic growth in 
 7 
 
China. As economic uncertainties increased, doing business at the border became 
riskier.4 Strategic border crossing became all the more necessary in the local narrative 
of survival.  
The next section of the article presents a brief discussion of the history of trans-
regional trade in this borderland. I then describe the various ways in which traders use 
both formal and informal crossing points as flexible means of traversing the border in 
pursuit of profits. Through the narratives and experiences of traders, residents, and local 
state agents, this article aims to show that borderland permissive politics give space and 
normalcy to both formal and informal transborder movements, and naturalize everyday 
transgressions.  Localized, entrepreneurial interplays of power and strategy are the 
context for these movements. 
 
The China-Vietnam Border and Trans-Regional Trade  
The border town of Hekou is situated at the confluence point of the Red River (Sông 
Hồng) and the Nanxi River (Sông Nậm Thi)  on the China-Vietnam frontier. These 
rivers form the international boundaries between the two countries. Their location on 
these waterways have made the border towns of Hekou and Lào Cai vital hubs along the 
trade routes for sea salt and spices, horses and cattle for centuries. Everyday goods 
essential to local livelihoods flowed in and out of the frontier zones. Traders bought and 
sold prohibited and often highly priced commodities such as opium and weapons along 
local river and mountain routes (Yan 2002, p. 95). For those who resided in the 
peripheries of what are now modern nation-states, these waterways were both channels 
of trans-regional exchange and the principal basis of  sustenance. Trade waxed and 
waned with dynastic and political regime changes. For generations, traders travelled to 
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evade wars and unrest, and to seek wealth and fortune in the remote peripheries away 
from central sites of political power. The long histories of territorial and political 
marginalization of the borderland and of trans-regional circulation have made the 
frontier a particular zone of economic opportunity.  
Land borders separated the realms of pre-modern Chinese and Vietnamese 
sovereignty, as zones of imperial frontier governance rather than in the form of clearly 
demarcated boundaries (Zhang and Saxer 2017).5 The French colonizers and the Qing 
rulers demarcated more precise borders in the late nineteenth century based on the 
general recognition of such zones and the patterns of interaction. They planted border 
markers in areas that were accessible. This era also marked the period in which more 
modern forms of transborder trade began to take shape. French explorers surveyed the 
Red River during  and realized that the Hekou could be the gateway to the interior of 
China. Imperial France began the construction of a railway linking Kunming and Hải 
Phòng. The Qing dynasty also set up  customs offices in Hekou to issue travel passes 
and permits to merchants, labourers and travellers. With the completion of the railway 
in 1910, novel items such as pocket watches and nylon stockings appeared in the 
markets of Kunming. Yunnan started to export tin by rail. The French retained 
ownership of the railway and collected rent and taxes from companies, tin mines, and 
tea plantations. The railway bridge at Hekou became the official border crossing point 
through which trans-border flows of people and goods flowed, and at which authorities 
controlled them (Yan 2002, p. 94).  
In the early twentieth century, its access to both waterways and the railway led 
merchants from Hong Kong, Hải Phòng and Hà Nội to set up trading companies at this 
point on the border (Yan 2002, p. 94). Chinese traders from Guangdong and Guangxi 
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provinces also came to Hekou to explore business opportunities (Yan 2002, p. 94).  The 
historical records of Hekou county documented the  thriving business scene at the port 
of Hekou. “Three hundred large ships and thousands of small boats cruise the Red River 
every day. The sails at the port gather like clouds in the sky. They come and go like 
busy ants” (Li 2002, p. 1). The border port gained the reputation of being a “Little Hong 
Kong” (Xiao Xianggang) thanks to the transborder flows of merchants, travellers, and 
commodities (Li 2002, p. 1).  
Apart from tin, tea, and the other licit commodities that passed through this 
border port, Hekou’s prosperity also depended heavily on flows of lucrative contraband 
commodities.  The Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century badly affected China’s 
vast inland regions. Yet this frontier thrived on new trade opportunities. Opium, banned 
in most regional centres in China, became highly valuable. It flowed into the country 
through waterways and trade networks that converged at Hekou in this part of the 
region. Wealthy traders and landlords who fled the violence of the Opium Wars settled 
down at China’s periphery, opening stores, brothels, opium dens and gambling halls. 
Apart from opium, gold, silver, tobacco, and medicine were among the highly profitable 
contraband goods that moved through this border (Chien 1980;  Chiranan Prasertkul 
1989, p. 65).  
Today the trade networks centred on Hekou and Lào Cai and the towns’ 
historical linkages with adjacent regions have once again gained prominence, as the 
remote frontier now connects China and Southeast Asia to the world economy. The 
state has validated the long history of transborder flows as a distinct local culture and a 
tradition that legitimize contemporary economic rationalities and national policies 
promoting “opening up” and regional economic integration. This borderland’s strategic 
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location —far away from national  centres and yet close to trans-regional markets — 
makes it possible for it to become a particular space of opportunity both more regulated 
and more freewheeling at the same time, and thus attractive to capital while still within 
the of control of the ruling authorities (Nyíri 2012, p. 555). The new boom in 
transborder flows happened immediately after the end of the decade-long border 
conflicts between China and Vietnam (1979–89). In the late 1980s, China and Vietnam 
each embarked on projects of economic reform. This period was also when 
borderlanders began setting up small-scale businesses and undertaking exchanges across 
the rivers that defined the border near Hekou and Lào Cai. Formal and informal trade, 
along with other forms of economic activity, began to flourish (Li 2002, p. 1; Chan 
2005, p. 218).  
Although border trade between China and Vietnam only accounts for a small 
part of China’s overall economic engagement with Southeast Asia (Tai and Soong 2014, 
pp. 25-27), that trade has significance as part China’s effort to establish political and 
economic leadership in the region. The Chinese state uses what Aihwa Ong  calls 
“zoning technologies” to open up China’s borderlands as special economic zones and to 
attract global capital to them (Ong 2006, p. 97).  Border zones have become important 
parts of  various  economic corridors, belts and cross-national associations, as the pace 
of regional cooperation has accelerated. China’s borders have become newly explored 
social spaces that evoke images of freedom, opportunity and wealth. Caught up in this 
new social imagination, Chinese have begun to dream about making a fortune in these 
newly opened zones of contact. A “border trade fever” (bianmao re) has taken took hold 
of both newcomers and long-term residents who believe that they can realize their 
aspirations of personal wealth and success through border trade (Li 2002, p. 1).  
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Twenty years into the fever, economic activity at the border has grown 
significantly. In 2016, Hekou’s revenue from imports and exports totalled more than 10 
billion yuan, or approximately US$1.4 billion. This figure signalled Hekou’s status as 
one of the top performing towns in Yunnan province in terms of economic success 
(Xinhua News 19 February 2017 ). Hekou’s immigration office recorded over 37 
million foreign visitors, and more than 200,000 vehicles passed across the border in 
2016. This latter total was the highest among all border entry points in Yunnan province 
(Xinhua News 5 January 2017 ). Highly valued commodities such as iron ore, fertilizer, 
timber, motorbikes, cars, heavy machinery, electrical goods, and agricultural products 
such as flowers, coffee and seasonal fruit are now part of transborder flows at Hekou 
(Chen roads, two immigration buildings, three border trade markets, and one 
international logistics centre (wuliu yuan). It has numerous hotels, shops, restaurants 
and entertainment venues. This once remote border town is now seamlessly integrated 
into global circuits of people, capital, resources and technologies.  
 
Becoming Borderland Entrepreneurs  
The drastic transformation of Hekou mirrored the personal transformations of Chinese 
traders at the border. The popular Chinese newspaper Southern Weekly (nanfang 
zhoumo) featured a story in 2004 on traders from Guangdong who had ridden  the tide 
of “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang) in the early 1990s and accumulated fortunes by 
becoming pioneers in the Sino-Vietnamese border trade (Fu and Ji 2004). It started with 
a few individuals who bartered and exchanged essential household products with 
Vietnam. Vietnamese needed products such as cotton cloth, flashlights, electric fans and 
furniture, and Chinese liked Vietnamese specialties (techan) — squid, snakes, bananas 
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and green-bean cakes. In 1992, after the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations, 
border villages quickly became bustling marketplaces with an influx of traders from 
Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces (Fu and Ji 2004). One trader, Mr Ma, who began by 
selling women’s underwear to Vietnamese customers, remembered the early days of the 
Sino-Vietnamese border trade. 
 
At that time [in the early 1990s], the condition [at the border] was terrible 
— no water, no electricity, and the stores were made with decaying wooden 
blocks. Countless landmines from the war were still hidden in the 
surrounding mountains and riverbanks. From time to time, you’d hear news 
about how people were blown up into pieces. I wanted to quit doing 
business here but somehow I decided to stick it out. In 1994, I earned my 
first 10,000 [yuan]. In 1996, 1997, business became more difficult. The 
living standard in Vietnam was improving and there was a growing demand 
for low-end electrical appliances. That’s when I switched to selling 
television, VCD players and stereos that were manufactured in Guangdong. 
(Fu and Ji 2004) 
 
Motivated by his success in the early 1990s, Mr Ma persuaded a dozen fellow 
businessmen from Chaozhou, his native city in Guangdong, to venture into cross-border 
trade with Vietnam on a larger scale. They registered a  trading company and operated 
hundreds of “household workshops” (jiating zuofang) to assemble electrical appliances 
and to produce ready-to-wear apparel in Shantou, Guangdong province. Mr Ma and his 
business partners exported the products through Hekou. By the end of the 1990s, the 
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annual profits of this business grew to more than one million yuan. Through 
“specialized channels” (teshu qudao), Mr Ma and his business counterparts sold locally 
assembled electrical appliances not only in Vietnam, but also in other parts of Southeast 
Asia and as far away as Eastern Europe and America. Mr Ma claimed that the Southeast 
Asian low-end market was their ultimate target (Fu and Ji 2004).  
Similar stories of success are common in Hekou. Despite the humble beginnings 
of their businesses, many traders were able to transform themselves into entrepreneurs 
with new social status. One retired Hekou government employee, Xiao Liang shared 
with me his own experience of the booming border trade in the 1990s. A native of Gejiu 
city in Yunnan province, Xiao Liang was assigned to the Hekou border in the mid-
1980s to do “frontier work” (bianjiang gongzuo, fieldnotes, April 2007, Hekou) — a 
particular term for frontier modernization and security under socialism. Doing business 
was still officially illegal at the border during that time, he said. However, Hekou and 
Lào Cai residents took advantage of the local government’s policy of permitting 
relatives to visit to engage in covert business exchanges. Using the railway bridge as the 
main point of crossing for such visits, borderlanders would take gifts to their relatives. 
These gifts included everyday items such as clothes, kitchen ware, vegetables, salted 
meat, smoked sausages and medicinal ointment. Some in Hekou saw opportunities in 
these visits and began trading goods in the form of “gift exchange” (songli) across the 
border. Xiao Liang’s acquaintance Lao Wang,  a maintenance clerk at the Hekou Farm 
Hostel, was one of the few who seized this opportunity. Lao Wang came from Yuxi 
city, the famous centre of tobacco productionin Yunnan. Although he did not have any 
relatives in Lào Cai, he began visiting “relatives” (qinqi) across the border and 
exchanging gift cigarettes for cash and other commodities.6  
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At first, Xiao Liang was very concerned about Lao Wang’s practices and 
worried about the consequences his being caught. In retrospect,  he laughs at his former 
caution and says that he was not made of “business material” (bushi zuoshengyi de 
liao). 
When I met Lao Wang at the time of  one of their reunions during my fieldwork, 
I asked him whether he had been afraid of getting caught for engaging in those 
activities. Lao Wang told me that he did not think it was not dangerous or illegal to do 
what he had done since it was “permitted” (yunxu). “There was so much news about 
large-scale smuggling at the border”, he said, “why would the police catch me and the 
small [sum of] money that I was making?” “Besides”, he added, “I was going through 
the official way. I was not smuggling cigarettes by boat, right? If you take the official 
way, they [the customs office] don’t suspect anything. You have to take a chance when 
opportunities are there.”7  
Lao Wang’s experience is a telling example of the permissive politics that have 
obtained at the borderland since the early 1990s. While the Chinese authorities 
continued to set the norms and to control the border, it became increasingly apparent 
that the state also encouraged more flexible practices and individual strategies and 
experiments. By the mid-1990s, the Chinese authorities had lifted their heavy-handed 
control of the local marketplace and governed only from “afar” (Zhang and Ong 2008, 
p. 1). The state encouraged ordinary Chinese to take care of themselves in their search 
for wealth and welfare. Both individuals and local governments had to find ways to 
support themselves without “relying on the state” (kao guojia). A sense of “relying on 
oneself” (kao ziji) and “self-care” (zizhu) became vital in the making of a new social 
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space at the border where both local governments and individuals experimented with 
what was permissible in the increasingly competitive transborder marketplace.8  
The borderlanders in Hekou share the understanding that, in order to take care of 
themselves at the nation’s edge, they may exploit grey areas. These grey areas are part 
of the borderland economic space that the state has carved out and of which it tacitly 
approves.. Traders in the town believe that they can take advantage of this  space of 
permission whenever possible and occupy strategic positions within it. They  are 
convinced that it is not wrong, for example, to evade certain tax payments, or to cut 
corners with legal documentation and customs paperwork, if they can find a way. It is 
also possible to arrange to move highly controlled commodities via the first-class 
crossing points on the bridge. They insist that they are not trying to walk the line 
between legality and illegality, and they certainly have no intention of defying state 
authorities. Instead, they argue that they are simply using local knowledge to gain  
economic advantage and to ensure that cross-border business operates smoothly.  
A Hekou businessman Liu Shan, who ran a small import-export “agency firm” 
(daili gongsi), described the usual way of carrying out cross-border business at first-
class crossing points through local middlemen and companies. If a non-local 
businessperson wanted to import certain commodities from Vietnam or to export 
commodities to Vietnam, she or he needed to find a local agency firm company first. 
The firm took delivery of the cargo at the border and found a way to see it through the 
border crossing and deliver it to the businessperson’s partners in Vietnam. The agency 
firm worked with customs officers, quarantine examiners and tax accountants with 
whom it had established relationships it was well acquainted with. The accountants 
managed the accounts, while the customs officers examined the quantity and value of 
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the cargo. The inspection determined whether the actual cargo matched items on the 
declaration form and whether it included prohibited items. What happened next was a 
negotiation. The agency firm company negotiated with the customs office to reduce the 
taxes and fees owed. For example, in the case of  thirty tons of commodities in a 
truckload, the agency firm might declare only twenty-seven or twenty-eight tons. For a 
fleet of nine to ten trucks, the tax payments and fees saved were considerable. The 
agency firm also made sure that the entire transaction went smoothly. If the authorities 
detected violations, it would ensure that the problem did not become so serious that it 
would delay or jeopardize the entire business transaction9. 
Liu Shan said that the agency firm required solid local networks and connections 
to undertake such activities. This need also explained both why agency firm companies 
were always locally run and why they were essential in cross-border trade. As the owner 
of such a firm, he said that it is crucial key to have good friends in the local 
government, in the immigration and customs offices, and in borderland business 
circles10.  
Liu Shan’s description of the activities of firms like his own offers a glimpse 
into the world of transborder business carried out on the bridge and made possible by 
relations among traders, officials, middlemen, various gatekeepers and professional 
service providers. The agency firms in Hekou mostly make contact and liaise with 
different authorities and personnel to ensure that their clients , gatekeepers, various 
parties in business partnerships and they themselves may make reasonable profits on 
transactions. On average, Liu said, an agency firm made a profit ranging from a few 
thousand to 20,000 or 30,000 yuan on each business deal, depending on the kinds of 
commodities that moved across the border and their market price. For him and many 
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other local businessmen, these transactions were easy and brought good returns.11  
Local businesspeople do not consider tax evasion, bribery, gratuities and kickbacks  
illegal because the smooth operation of any business deal involves certain levels of 
collaboration with state gatekeepers and government authorities (Endres 2014, p. 611). 
Moreover, businesspeople and local authorities observe state regulations at the official 
border to develop local norms and to keep the trade flowing. A retired customs officer 
who had worked in Hekou Customs told me that, in fact, borderland traders are the most 
diligent observers of state policies and regulations in transborder trade. He said,  
In Hekou, smuggling happens on the bridge too, just like any other business 
that operates here. We all follow state policies every step of the way. 
Smuggling is not a secretive trick that only criminals do. Sometimes as 
officers, we also understand why this has to be done. For example, if today 
the government suddenly issues an order to cancel the tax-refund policy on 
the exportation of cement, all the companies that trade cement will suffer a 
huge loss just because of the sudden policy change. So they have to figure 
out a way to cover their losses and still try to make the business profitable. 
They may reduce the quantity on the declaration form when they clear 
customs, or just report the goods as “construction materials” rather than 
cement in order to claim the tax-refund. Sometimes for political reasons, the 
government may classify certain items such as rare metal as prohibited 
goods even though these were tradable a few weeks ago. Companies 
specializing in rare metals are in trouble. That’s why we are sympathetic 
and understand why businessmen do this. They don’t really have a lot of 
other options. Here in Hekou, the authorities usually know what is going on. 
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Unless the government demands that we catch the rule-breakers as a 
warning, oftentimes we just turn a blind eye to these sorts of violations.12  
 
Local traders do not see their  evasion of the law as illegal. Rather, they view it as 
a survival strategy generally permitted by authorities. They often complain that the 
government’s shifting politics and economic policies make cross-border businesses 
difficult to operate.13 Under these circumstances, smuggling seems to be a necessity.  I 
use the term “smuggling” in the way that borderlanders describe their own practices and 
not in a criminal sense. The Chinese term for “smuggling”, zousi, literally means to 
“pass private goods” or to “walk the private way”, and it does carry negative 
connotations and suggest illegality. However, in the context of the borderland, its 
everyday meaning has been more or less de-stigmatized. This situation is similar to that 
which MacGaffey describes in her analysis of the economy in the former Zaire,  where 
smuggling constitutes a “second economy”, an integral and significant part of the 
national economy (MacGaffey 1991, p. 43_). Flynn points out that the notion of 
“smuggling” often fails to represent the ways in which border residents stake their 
economic claim in transborder trade (Flynn 1997, p. 312_). What is happening in the 
China-Vietnam borderland resembles the traders’ strategies in Indonesia’s Riau islands, 
as described by Michelle Ford and Lenore Lyons.  
 
Decentralisation has allowed locally-based state agents to pass regulations 
that permit locally licit (socially acceptable) but formally illegal practices, 
sometimes even in contravention of national laws. … What we are talking 
about, therefore, is not a gap between the state’s understanding of criminal 
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activity and individuals’ understanding of criminal activity … but rather a 
situation in which the agents of local state structures act in ways that defy 
centrally defined notions of legality but conform to the local community’s 
understandings of licitness. (Ford and Lyons 2012, p. 106, emphasis in 
original) 
 
In Hekou, the flows of goods on the bridge render the boundaries of legality and 
illegality ambiguous, as state agents and other local actors make and remake local 
norms. As transborder movements of people and goods continue to shape social 
relations, borderlanders find themselves constantly navigating between official 
regulations and private, flexible forms of engagement. A few traders shared with me 
their belief that the kind of smuggling happening at the border is not against local rules, 
“It’s not like we are trading guns and arms, drugs or precious gem stones. That would 
be illegal. We are just trying to cut down some tax payment, or stretch a little more on 
fruits, cigarettes and fertilizers. This is just making ends meet.”14  
 
Entrepreneurial Transgression  
“Just making ends meet” (tao shenghuo) provides the moral grounds for Chinese traders 
and state agents to legitimize their activities within the borderland regime of 
permissiveness. It also renders transgressive actions normal, and even essential, daily 
practice—not to be outlawed, but to be understood as local strategies. I call these 
actions “entrepreneurial transgression” to reflect the strategic manoeuvring and flexible 
forging of relationships permitted in the borderland context. Transgressive actions such 
as smuggling open up new spaces of opportunity for local collaborations and profit-
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making without threatening  laws and state legitimacy. They are interpreted locally as 
entrepreneurial and regarded as economic practices without political risks. Those 
engaged in them carve out unique zones of licitness that sustain borderland economic 
life.  
Apart from the first-class crossing point, borderlanders at Hekou also frequently 
use two main second-class crossing points. The first crossing is primarily used for 
transporting people — vendors, workers, tourists — who do not have border resident 
status and who to cross the border quickly without suffering hassles  at the hands of 
immigration authorities. This crossing offers a  route that is useful in meeting everyday 
needs. The second popular crossing point is located some distance away from town. It is 
a stretch of dry pebbly riverbank that can be used for docking boats. Since the second 
crossing offers a bigger docking area than the first, traders use it mainly for transporting 
goods and commodities. Occasionally, tourists and non-local traders use it, if the police 
are monitoring the first crossing to conduct their periodic inspections and raids.15  
Local traders told me that they often used the bridge if they were moving metal, 
cement, machines, plastic wares and other non-perishable commodities.16 The 
transaction process on the bridge was usually rather slow; it could take several days for  
commodities to be checked, valuated, declared and shipped. Traders who dealt with 
perishable products  needed to factor in a few more days for disease control and 
quarantine. By the time that they made it through clearance procedures, their goods 
might be damaged or spoilt. The second crossing thus provided an alternative route for a 
speedy passage.  
Traders also use these unofficial crossing points  to transport highly regulated 
goods of great commercial value, such as tobacco, liquor and spirits, rice, cosmetic 
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products, timber, rare metals, coal, electronic products and other items; it depends what 
is included in the official list of prohibited items in a particular trade season. For 
instance, rice trader Wei Fen told me that the second crossing offered an important 
alternative route for his business.17 Rice was a highly valued commodity, strictly 
regulated by both the Chinese and the Vietnamese authorities. Chinese buyers had to 
obtain official permission and to have an import quota from the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce before they could bring Vietnamese rice into China. If a trader failed to 
obtain this official permission or wished to trade more than her or his quota allowed,  
she or he could incur a substantial tariff.. To reduce costs, traders therefore turned to 
boats and second-class border crossings.  There was no waiting time, and no need to 
make tax payments, and the transactions proceeded smoothly as long as traders had  
connections with the right middlemen and officials.18  
Like most traders, Wei Fen did not think that what he described was illegal. On 
the contrary, he saw his ability to manoeuvre through the various layers of regulations 
and to use different means of crossing the border in order to close a business deal as an 
indication of his entrepreneurial sensibility and capability. Wei Fen insisted that not 
everyone doing business along the border knows how to make use of the second-class 
border crossings, or recognized the advantage that these alternative routes offered. It  
took particular skill to complete transactions using these routes without getting caught, 
and to avoid trouble if one were unfortunate enough to be caught. Wei Fen gave  the 
example of a fellow businesswoman from Sichuan province who had sought to import 
rice from Vietnam. Having no close relationships with  traders and officials at Hekou, 
she simply contacted a Vietnamese supplier and made plans to move the rice by boat via 
the second-class crossing. When Hekou customs authority and the border police became 
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aware of her plans , they arranged a stakeout for the night of the shipment and 
eventually confiscated the rice. Not knowing what to do, this Sichuan trader then 
suggested to the officers that they overlook what she had done in exchange for a bribe. 
Wei Fen was laughing when he told me about this incident.  
 
This Sichuan trader wants to go by the second crossing without working 
with a local? She has no experience with border trade. Does she think that 
this is her own backyard, and that she can cross any time she wants to? This 
is still our national border. She is not afraid of taking risks, but she has no 
strategy; and she panics when things don’t pan out as planned. That is why 
she gets caught.19  
 
Doing business at the borderland requires that a trader be more than just a risk-taker. 
She or he must know when to do what; have a good grasp of market trends, government 
policies and networks that she or he mobilize for different purposes; and be resourceful 
when things do not go as planned. Social connections in particular are a trader’s most 
important asset in the borderland marketplace.20 As  competition grows more intense, 
chances for success become increasingly low. It is common knowledge that “mutual 
prosperity” (gongtong fuyu) benefits everyone in a network of associates, partners and 
acquaintances. Members of the network share similar goals and desires and  have access 
to crucial resources and connections.  
Wei Fen was confident about his own rice trading activities  and about using 
both the official border crossing and the second-class border crossings strategically. 
Over the years, he had cultivated strong connections with  local authorities in Hekou 
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and established friendships with customs officers, government officials and the police. 
He had ways of obtaining  information from his contacts when planning shipment by 
means of unofficial crossings. On one occasion, Wei Fen invited me to have dinner with 
his friends from the customs office. He took me to a Sichuan restaurant twenty minutes 
before the appointed time for the gathering, and ordered the most expensive dishes on 
the menu. He explained that, when his friends arrived, the staff of the restaurant could 
serve the dishes right away.. When the banquet began, Wei Fen introduced me to an 
officer in his late thirties, Zhong Jun. Officer Zhong told me, “You’ve got the right 
contact for business in Hekou if you know Wei Fen. He is a “red capitalist” (hongse 
zibenjia) in Hekou, very successful. Old Wei, how many millions do you have by 
now?”21  
Later on, when officer Zhong and I were better acquainted, he told me that he 
never had to eat by himself or to pay for his meals in Hekou. Traders in town wanted to 
be his friends and to pay his bills. However, Zhong was very careful about the social 
circle in which he moved. Traders like Wei Fen were good partners because they were 
“rule-abiding” (shou guiju) and  practised discretion when they made deals. Traders 
with more complicated backgrounds, like those with connections with  gangs and 
organized crime, were more troublesome. When officer Zhong described Wei Fen as a 
“law-abiding” trader, I asked him, “Isn’t it against the law to trade rice using the second 
crossing, without going through customs?” Zhong replied,  
 
When you went to the crossing point last time, did you notice the building 
right by the river near the crossing point? That is a branch of our office. Do 
you think that we don’t know what’s going on at that crossing every night? 
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At the border, there are two kinds of transgressions — breaking the law 
(fanfa) and violating the rules (weigui). For those who break the law 
because of illegal crossing, our office can confiscate their commodities, fine 
and arrest them. But for those who only violate the rules, we give them a 
warning, a fine and let them go. Do you see the difference?22  
 
Officers working in the Hekou customs office also told me that “combatting smuggling” 
(daji zousi) was not about making arrests. Rather, it was about whom to catch, and 
when and where the authorities should intervene. They did not usually stand in the way 
of those who were generally “good citizens” (liangmin) in the borderland and just 
wanted to make money in the cross-border trade. This view was particularly the case if 
the “good traders” (laoshi de laoban) had established relations with local authorities. 
“After all”, one of the officers said, “the borderland economy is an ‘open’ market 
economy. If everything is tightly controlled, how would the local economy develop 
quickly?” Of course, they would approach the smuggling of weapons and drugs a strong 
hand. After all,  “this is still our national border”23. 
Traders often did not try to differentiate between “breaking the law” (fanfa) and 
“violating rules” (fangui). They were convinced that the differences were simply part of 
the local authorities’ scheme of profit-making (chuangshou). The pineapple trader Wen 
Jiansheng told me,  
 
If they [the officers] let everything pass only through the official border 
crossing, how can they make money for themselves? When they catch those 
who are not well connected, they can confiscate the commodities and 
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impose a hefty fine. Afterwards they can sell the commodities to someone 
else and earn additional income. They are not stupid. They are also doing 
good business.24  
 
The regime of permissiveness in Hekou allows traders to cross and officials to 
control the border in an entrepreneurial fashion. Interpersonal connections between 
various parties and actors play an important role determining what is possible and what 
is not. The resulting ambiguity has created soft and porous international borders 
between China and Vietnam. The local authorities tacitly tolerate entrepreneurial 
transgressions as long as traders partner up with those authorities. The boundaries of 
legality can be stretched and bent when local actors collaborate with authorities, and 
when mutual interests are served. The boundaries can be “hardened” when such 
collaboration collapse and when  partnerships break down.  
 
Conclusion  
Andrew Walker’s ethnography of trade and regulation in the Upper Mekong borderland 
notes that global flows now provide a myriad of new opportunities for “profitable 
regulation” (Walker 1999, p. 111). In the case of Hekou, both local commercial actors 
and authorities actively engage in this kind of profitable regulation in pursuit of wealth 
and legitimacy. Traders develop strategies for making deals on the basis of their local 
knowledge and personal networks. They do not avoid involvement with borderland 
authorities, but instead use their personalized relations with official gatekeepers to 
manoeuvre along flexible pathways across borders. State agents are not “robotic agents 
of a hegemonic state” either (Walker 1999, p. 112). They constitute important parts of 
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the border trade network and often collaborate with local traders both to pursue both 
personal gains and to benefit borderland economic flows.  
The different points of border crossing constitute interlaced spaces of 
engagement. The bridge continues to represent the official national border at which the 
state and state authorities oversee flows of people and goods. Although the formality of 
the bridge represents the legality of flows across it, actual practices may be flexible and 
transgressive. The less visible passages by boat are not subversive. Nor do they offer a 
local form of “resistance” against state regulations and control. The entrepreneurial 
transgressions taking place at these crossings suggest a need to look at the permissive 
dynamics that sustain transborder trade. We must take into account local actors’ and 
authorities’  interactions with one another, as they to seek control and profit from the 
border itself. 
The border between Vietnam and China is lived and negotiated in flexible ways by 
both state authorities and local agents. Members of the two groups have created  the 
situated rules of engagement that constitute a particular space of opportunity. In this 
space,  private forms of practices are in tacit collaboration with state regulations. These 
localized practices challenge the conventional understanding that unauthorized flows 
threaten the legitimacy of national borders. They make clear that borders are, in 
contrast, constitutive of the dynamic flows of strategy and power in the local social 
worlds at the margins of nation states.
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